Suicide in the Canadian Forces

Suicide is a concern for all Canadians. According to the Canadian Mental Health Association, suicide is the second leading cause of death among young people, after motor vehicle accidents (http://www.cmha.ca, 2009).

The health needs, including mental health needs, of military personnel are a top priority for the Canadian Forces (CF) and the Government of Canada. The death of even one CF member by suicide is too many. The CF takes the issue of member suicide very seriously and ensures that all personnel undergo regular suicide awareness and intervention training programs. Extensive efforts are expended to identify people at risk for mental health problems and to provide them with the assistance that they require.

Suicide rates among CF personnel have been generally decreasing. The rate of suicide among male CF personnel during the period 2005-2008 was lower than the rate during the period 2000-2004, which was lower than the rate during the period 1995-1999.
Suicide rates

In tabulating suicide rates, the CF does not include the deaths of civilians on Department of National Defence (DND) property or the deaths of DND employees, off-duty Reserve Forces personnel or Canadian Rangers.

It should be noted that the records of the Military Police (MP), on which all CF suicide figures are based, are subject to misinterpretation due to the fact that MPs log all investigations of “sudden deaths” together, whether these later turn out to be suicides, accidental deaths or deaths from natural causes.

The figures in Table A originate with the CF Director Force Health Protection (DFHP). These figures are limited to suicides among Regular Forces personnel. CF rates of suicide appearing in Table A are calculated, like those of Statistics Canada, as a rate per 100,000.

Table A
Suicide rates among Regular Forces personnel, 1995-2008

Year (1) (2) (3)
====================================
1995 62,597 12 19.17
1996 57,608 8 13.89
1997 55,041 13 23.62
1998 54,485 13 23.86
1999 53,134 10 18.82
1995-99 282,865 56 19.8
2000 51,864 12 23.14
2001 51,008 10 19.6
2002 52,326 9 17.2
2003 53,752 9 16.74
2004 53,522 10 18.68
2000-04 262,472 50 19.1
2005 53,321 10 18.75
2006 53,985 7 12.97
2007 54,673 9 16.46
2008 55,627 13 23.37
2005-08 217,606 39 17.9


(1) Number of male CF personnel
(2) Number of suicides among male CF personnel
(3) CF male suicide rate per 100,000


As Table A illustrates, from 1995 to 1999, the rate of suicide among male Regular Force personnel approximated 19.8 per 100,000, or one in 5,051. From 2000 to 2004, the rate of suicide among male Regular Force personnel approximated 19.1 per 100,000, or one in 5,236. From 2005 to 2008, the rate of suicide among male Regular Force personnel approximated 17.9 per 100,000, or one in 5,587.

The rate of suicide among female CF personnel is extremely low. It is more useful to report the following numbers: there were no suicides among female Regular Force personnel from 1995 to 2001, there was one in 2002, there were two in 2003, there were none in 2004 or 2005, there was one in 2006, one in 2007 and one in 2008.

The figures in Table B originate with the CF Director Casualty Support Administration, which coordinates benefits. These figures include some Reserve Forces personnel.

Table B
Suicide rates among Canadian Forces personnel, 2002-2008

Year


Number of suicides among CF personnel

2002


12

2003


11

2004


13

2005


11

2006


11

2007


12

2008


15

The CF does not have complete records on Reserve Forces suicides. There is considerable turnover in the Reserve Forces, especially among part-time Reservists. Suicides among part-time Reservists may not be captured unless they are brought to the attention of the military by civilian authorities. Plans are underway to link the names of all CF members from 1972 to the present to Statistics Canada’s mortality database to correct this situation.

The differences between figures in these tables relating to any given year reflect the complexities involved in tracking suicides among members of any population. CF leadership is continually engaged in discussions on the subject of improving record keeping.
Intervention

CF suicide intervention training ranges from a two-day, skill-based workshop called “ASIST” (Applied Suicide Intervention Skills) to shorter awareness sessions based on identifying signs, symptoms and resources. This training takes place under the CF’s larger scheme of promoting healthy living and preventing injury and illness through the development of self-help programs. Similar workshops educate CF personnel on anger management, addiction awareness and prevention, stress management, and family violence prevention.

No consistent relationship has been discovered between deployment and increased risk of suicide. Nevertheless, there is a pre-deployment mental health screening process in place for CF personnel, and troops are prepared in various ways to deal with possible trauma overseas. For those personnel deploying on stressful operations and missions, good mission preparation and training is critical. This includes education on stress-coping skills, unit cohesion and social support, and awareness of the potential effects of stress. Training is realistic and is designed to bolster confidence in both individual and team capabilities.

All CF personnel returning from an international operation of 60 or more days’ duration undergo an Enhanced Post-deployment Screening Process. This takes place between 90 and 180 days after their return to Canada, although nothing prevents an individual who has any concerns from coming forward to seek help at an earlier time. The Post-deployment Screening is meant to better identify those with deployment-related problems, with a particular focus on psychological problems. The CF member completes a detailed health questionnaire and has an in-depth interview with a mental health professional. The interviewer completes a form recording a clinical impression and a recommendation for follow-up care.

The CF also conducts periodic health assessments on its members on a regular basis, where mental health problems can be diagnosed and treated.

Captain Robert Semrau

The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) has launched an investigation into allegations of inappropriate conduct relating to the death of a presumed insurgent in Helmand Province on or about October 19, 2008.

The Commander Task Force Kandahar was made aware of the allegations on December 27, 2008 and notified the CFNIS who immediately initiated an investigation. The CFNIS is investigating the allegations to determine the facts, analyze the evidence and if warranted, lay the appropriate charges. As the investigation is ongoing, no further details will be released at this time.

The CFNIS is an independent Military Police unit with a mandate to investigate serious and sensitive matters in relation to National Defence property, Departmental employees and Canadian Forces personnel serving in Canada and abroad.

Master Cpl. Jeffrey Scott Walsh

Born to a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officer on August 8 1973, Master Cpl. Jeffrey Scott Walsh was a Canadian Forces soldier, killed while on duty in Afghanistan by another Canadian soldier. Both were members of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry.

The father of three children, Walsh arrived in Kandahar on August 3 2006[2]. Six days later, Walsh was riding in a G-Wagon with Master Cpl. Robbie Fraser, when Fraser's gun accidentally discharged, killing Walsh.

Fraser was charged by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service with manslaughter and negligent performance of duty. On October 14, 2008, charges against Fraser were dropped.

OTTAWA – Captain (Navy) Holly MacDougall, the Canadian Forces Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP), has withdrawn the charges of Manslaughter and Negligently Performing a Military Duty against Master-Corporal Robbie Fraser in the shooting death of Master Corporal Jeffrey Scott Walsh.

On August 9, 2006, while deployed to Afghanistan, Master Corporal Walsh was killed in a shooting incident. On March 12, 2007, the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) brought charges against Master Corporal Robbie Fraser. These charges were then referred to the DMP by the chain of command on July 11, 2007.

“In this case the defence counsel demonstrated to the prosecutors a possible reconstruction of the events that led to the death of MCpl Walsh,” says Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce MacGregor, Deputy Director of Military Prosecutions and prosecutor at the Court Martial of MCpl Fraser. “The evidential foundation to this reconstruction was provided by the accused over the Thanksgiving weekend, although he was under no obligation to do so. The prosecutors in this case analyzed the evidence that was not previously available and the defence theory and spoke with key witnesses including an RCMP ballistic expert to determine if the theory was reasonable. Once it was established that this scenario provided a reasonable explanation for the shooting, the prosecutors concluded that they no longer had a reasonable prospect of conviction and had a duty to withdraw the charges.”

The charge of Manslaughter was contrary to Section 130 of the National Defence Act, which incorporates Section 236 of the Criminal Code. The charge of Negligently Performing a Military Duty was contrary to Section 124 of the National Defence Act.
MCpl Fraser is currently a soldier with the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), in Shilo, Manitoba.

Military prosecutors consider two main issues when deciding whether to prosecute a charge at court martial: whether the evidence is sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of conviction and whether the public interest requires a prosecution be pursued. They continually reassess these issues as new information about the case becomes available.

The DMP is a separate and independent authority for military prosecutions who exercises prosecutorial discretion within the military justice system, free of influences, and based on legal principles and criteria.